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How Data Became Part of New Orleans’ DNA during the Katrina
Recovery
Lamar Gardere1 Allison Plyer2 and Denice Ross3

Data intermediaries have a symbiotic relationship with government as the source of most of their
information. The open-data movement in government and development of software-as-a-service
technologies shaped the data landscape after Katrina. Through relationships and talent transfers
with The Data Center, the City of New Orleans went from having its chief technology officer in
federal prison and its data systems in shambles to being a nationally recognized leader in open and
accountable government. To be effective during disasters, an intermediary should be (1) in place
and widely respected before the event, (2) ready to respond immediately after the event and for the
long recovery, and (3) continually scanning the horizon for changes in data and technology.

Data Capacity in New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina and the Levee
Failures
Before the storm, decisions, program design, and funding in the nonprofit sector typically were
based on anecdotes and preconceptions. The Data Center (originally named the Greater New
Orleans Community Data Center) was founded in 1997 as a data intermediary. It had the dual goal
of making statistics more relevant and accessible while building community willingness and the
capacity to use numbers. To this end, we took a user-centered, demand-driven approach, starting
with the statistics needed for grant writing and program design. We invested significant time
attending meetings to find out what data the local nonprofit sector needed most. These
observations, combined with interviews with nonprofit leaders, revealed that more than anything
else, local nonprofits wanted basic demographic information about their neighborhoods to support
grant writing and program planning.
In 2002, we created a highly usable website with Census 2000 data compiled for all seventythree New Orleans neighborhoods. For each neighborhood, we published dozens of indicators,
carefully curated and categorized to answer 80 percent of the questions that nonprofits had. This
approach ensured that our audience did not have to plow through pages and pages of numbers to
get to indicators of greatest interest. Surrounding the indicators were just-in-time explanations of
what they represent and technical definitions of each indicator written in everyday language.
We also included a short narrative about each neighborhood called a “Neighborhood
Snapshot” that described each neighborhood’s distinctive features and history, with particular
emphasis on the historic contributions of African Americans to each neighborhood. This emphasis
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was chosen with the knowledge that New Orleans, for much of its history, had been majority
African American, and that the contributions of African Americans are too often overlooked in
official history books. In addition, we created content that addressed common questions about
data. We wrote one article about how to use a proxy when the statistics you want are not available,
and a series about how famous African Americans throughout history used statistics to advance
social justice aims.1 These additional efforts were essential to ensuring that our audience would
find the indicators on our website relevant and compelling.
To ensure that the data would be accessible, we conducted extensive usability testing of the
website.2 We knew from the literature that if our site was hard to use, the credibility of our content
would be reduced.3 Usability testing is a formal method of watching users interact with a system
to complete a task. We conducted this testing in users’ homes and offices, collecting and analyzing
information about these real-world interactions to inform design improvements. Usability testing
revealed specific ways to improve our categorization and labeling of indicators, as well as the
location of links on the website.4 After these improvements were made, the website was officially
launched. It became widely popular with local nonprofits and yielded an average of five thousand
unique visits a month—about five times more traffic than a similar website serving the even larger
and wonkier market of Washington, DC.
While the website answered 80 percent of our audience’s questions, the other 20 percent of
their questions could be answered by a technical assistance feature we called “Ask Allison.” To
build trust, rather than generically labeling this feature “Technical Assistance,” we featured a
staffer well-known in the community for data presentations and grant-writing trainings. Through
this feature, requesters could submit any data-related question they had and get a response within
one business day. With the aim of building self-efficacy to access and use statistics, we crafted
each answer as a step-by-step set of instructions about how to navigate the Census Bureau (or
other) website. We wrote the instructions in an intentionally friendly tone with references to
current events in the city (e.g., “Happy Mardi Gras”) to ensure local credibility and a personal
connection. We analyzed metrics created through the use of this feature to inform needed additions
to the indicators on the website based on the most common requests. We received an average of
one “Ask Allison” request every business day.
In the years before Hurricane Katrina, the nonprofit and civic sector was starting to make
strides in their level of data sophistication.5 For example, a spring 2005 internal evaluation of forty
grant proposals to a local philanthropy indicated that 55 percent of applicants effectively used
external metrics to make the case for their programming.6 But data-driven decision-making was
still the exception. Nonetheless, before Katrina, the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center
had established a strong reputation as a credible, friendly, and reliable partner among New Orleans’
grassroots nonprofit and community leaders.
In 2005, which predates the organized federal open-data movement codified by the federal
Open Government Directive in 2009,7 the City of New Orleans provided very little data to the
public beyond that available through onerous public records requests. These were the days of egov, where costly front-end systems allowed users to look up one address at a time (for example,
in the assessor or permitting databases) or to pay their property taxes online. Data-sharing between
city departments or other government agencies (such as the Regional Planning Commission)
tended to be ad hoc and quid pro quo. The city’s website domain was, appropriately,
cityofNO.com.8
It was easy to complain about the city’s data management, but two real challenges prevented
the city from realizing the value of metrics to improve efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of
2
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government services: civil service and procurement. Even in a fast-changing field like technology,
civil service job descriptions had not been modernized in over a decade, and they included obsolete
titles from the days of punch cards, such as “Lead Systems Programmer,” with obsolete pay to
match. As a result, contractors made up nearly half of the city’s IT staff.9 Crucial functions, such
as enterprise geographic information systems (GIS), were outsourced, meaning that when
Hurricane Katrina came, the city had little institutional knowledge and was unprepared from a data
perspective. Because of the condition of the city’s data management, The Data Center relied almost
exclusively on federal statistics before the storm; but the rapid pace of change after Katrina made
local metrics essential for paving the way for an informed and equitable recovery.

After the Storm
After the storm, federal statistics about New Orleans (including the Census 2000) became instantly
obsolete. At the same time, old ways of making decisions—based on historical precedence,
intuition, and personal relationships—no longer worked. The Data Center was inundated with
requests from the media, nonprofits, businesses, national researchers, multiple federal agencies,
community-based organizations, and federal, state, and local governments. Visits to the website
went from 5,000 a month to 120,000 in the two months after Hurricane Katrina.
Despite the demand, numerical facts were hard to come by. Three months after the storm, a
researcher with the Brookings Institution was quoted in the New York Times saying it had been
easier gathering data for Iraq than for New Orleans.10 At The Data Center, though our world had
turned upside down, our user-centered approach meant that we knew where to start. What
information do people need to accomplish what tasks? Our “Ask Allison” feature served as a
funnel and a knowledge management system for the wave of increasing requests. Requests tripled
from before Katrina and provided a treasure trove of evidence about the information people most
needed. Population counts quickly emerged as the highest value data set. Neighborhood
organizations needed information about which city blocks were at a tipping point of recovery so
they could deploy their limited case management and volunteer rebuilding resources. Healthcare
providers need to know where to place temporary and permanent clinics as neighborhoods slowly
rebuilt. Funders needed to know which neighborhoods most needed childcare centers. Beyond the
nonprofit sector, businesses needed to know neighborhood population density to consider opening
or reopening stores. Federal, state, and local agencies needed population numbers to inform
recovery efforts and continued program planning. Even evacuees needed facts on the repopulation
of their neighborhoods to inform their own decisions to return.
The Census Bureau was unable to provide this data because between decennial census counts
it produces only one annual population estimate at the county level with a nine-month lag time.
These estimates were neither timely enough nor granular enough to capture the rapid changes as
residents rebuilt and the city recovered. The Data Center researched a large number of
administrative data sets that might be a good indicator of repopulation and publicly available with
a short lag time. These sets included data from school enrollment, traffic volume, utility accounts,
drivers’ licenses, passenger car registrations, voter registration and participation, and United States
Postal Service (USPS) National Change of Address records and residences actively receiving mail.
USPS counts of active residences emerged as an indicator that best met criteria for a consistent
relationship to population while being publicly available every month with only a two-week lag.11
Although the numbers were publicly available, they were aggregated to ZIP codes and carrier
routes. To measure recovery, The Data Center needed counts at a more granular level with
consistent boundaries. We found that the direct marketing company Valassis had this information
3
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at the address level. In a move that foreshadowed today’s movement to private-sector data
philanthropy,12 where the public benefits from privately held data, The Data Center partnered with
Valassis to get monthly updates of households actively receiving mail at the address level.13
Additionally, technology was changing around us, as were the ways New Orleanians accessed
information. Disruptive mapping technologies such as Open Street Map (launched in 2004) and
Google Maps (2005) reduced barriers to producing interactive maps and fundamentally changed
the user experience for navigating online maps.14 The field of crisis mapping soon popped up,15
and The Data Center began to think more about purpose-built maps and apps with a short life span
customized to the needs of different phases of the recovery. In this new context we used Google
Maps to build the “Repopulation Mapper” that displayed the Valassis counts on households
receiving mail aggregated to the block level. More important, we posted metadata (explanation of
what the data is and what it is not) in plain sight and in everyday language. We conducted usability
testing in the field with tasks that replicated the frequent questions this mapper was designed to
address. Usability testing yielded tweaks to titles, the location of the legend, and changes to the
map display so that it was viewable even on the low-resolution screens still dominant among our
local users.16
In addition to supplying high-demand information such as block-level repopulation, The Data
Center found a pressing need to help community members, business investors, and policymakers
at the local, state, and federal levels to better understand the pace of recovery. Katrina brought
dramatic change and also flux for many years after the storm, which created chaos and confusion.
Investors both public and private wondered about the strength of the economy and the housing
market, the availability of needed infrastructure, and whether population was continuing to return
to New Orleans. Rumors swirled about what happened to the billions of dollars of recovery funding
allocated by Congress. Policymakers needed information about how to adapt and effectively
deploy their resources. Operating under differing goals and priorities, decision makers found
themselves in conflict with one another.17
To address these issues, The Data Center had to shift from disseminating raw indicators to
analysis. We formed a partnership with the Brookings Institution to identify and analyze indicators
of recovery in four domains: population, housing, economy, and infrastructure. To ensure that end
users could make use of the statistical trends, we created a report entitled “The New Orleans
Index,” with graphics of each indicator and a one-page narrative summary of findings.18 The report
was published monthly for the first two and a half years (when change was most rapid), then
quarterly, then biannually, and finally annually by the fifth anniversary of Hurricane Katrina. With
the aim of creating a common understanding of the trends to help inform decision makers as well
as the general public to move in a common direction, we extended our reach beyond our website.
We began using local and national TV, radio, and newspaper as new avenues for disseminating
our findings.
The New Orleans Index built on the reputations of The Data Center and Brookings for
credibility, trust, and neutrality to develop a common understanding of the recovery that was expert
(informed by Brookings’s expertise in trend analysis) and locally relevant (informed by The Data
Center’s one-the-ground knowledge of post-Katrina New Orleans). In addition, The Data Center’s
expertise in human-centered design ensured that the publications responded to changing needs and
questions and that the publications were easy to understand and use.19 Through briefings and
presentations, Brookings engaged federal stakeholders around the findings, while The Data Center
engaged community groups and local officials. Media mentions averaged hundreds each year. An
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independent evaluation of this multi-year effort concluded that The New Orleans Index series of
reports successfully:
● Built a shared understanding and common operating picture among diverse stakeholders
● Focused conversations on solutions and stopping debates about facts
● Communicated to officials and investors outside New Orleans, reducing uncertainty and
spurring investment
● Helped decision makers identify needs and adapt priorities, policies, strategies, and programs
● Spurred innovation20
Another shift The Data Center had to make as the recovery progressed was to turn to the city
for metrics on the recovery, since federal statistics were not timely enough or of sufficient
geographic detail. The aforementioned data capacity challenges of the city became increasingly
apparent. Months after the storm, Brookings alerted us that when they contacted the city’s
Department of Safety and Permits for the latest cumulative count of building permits, sometimes
the numbers were inexplicably half the previous month’s total. Years later we learned the cause:
rather than adapting the existing permitting system to accommodate kiosk and online applications
as demand for permits outpaced the ability of office staff to process them, IT contractors had built
an entirely new permitting system (with a different data schema) to take in permits electronically.
Thus, half of the permits were in-person using the pre-Katrina system and half used the new
electronic interface. To compile a basic count of building permits issued post-Katrina, a city
contractor had to combine these incompatible databases. This type of unnecessary complexity
made any timely, meaningful analysis of city-held data nearly impossible and further entrenched
the city’s dependence on its ballooning force of contractors. Some of these IT contracting
relationships would eventually land both the chief technology officer and the mayor in prison.21
With growing legal distractions among city leadership and increasingly pathological
complexity in the city’s IT systems, the role of The Data Center became even more important in
the years following the storm. Interestingly, other data intermediaries (such as The Data Center’s
peers in the Urban Institute’s National Neighborhood Indicators Partnership) have since played
similar roles during crises in city government, notably Data Driven Detroit during the city’s
bankruptcy and Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance after the death of Freddie Gray in
police custody. 22 When local government loses legitimacy, a trusted local data intermediary can
help fill key gaps until local government gets back on its feet.

The New Role of Data in New Orleans
In the early days after the storm, data sharing was still largely bilateral between limited
organizations, but an underground network emerged. For example, the city’s emergency operation
center distributed its “Daily Dashboard” to a list of select partner entities and these entities
forwarded it to other peers in the nonprofit sector. The same thing happened with other data sets,
such as the Rapid Population Estimates survey results and geographic information on the city’s
land ownership parcels.
Government’s limited sharing resulted in a disparity of information access across
neighborhoods. The Broadmoor neighborhood, which was inundated with high floodwaters,
partnered with the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and was able to get special access to
the city’s building permit data, which helped inform that neighborhood’s recovery.23 Knowing
how valuable such records were for all neighborhoods’ recoveries, The Data Center maintained
the drumbeat of equal access for all by obtaining and republishing data about the entire city, not
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just neighborhoods with the capacity to create their own numbers or connections to get special
access to information. President Barack Obama’s Open Government Directive came at a fortuitous
time during the mayoral election, inspiring new possibilities of government transparency.
When Mitch Landrieu was elected mayor in 2010, he formed the Tech Transition Team to
look into the city’s data management and IT practices and make recommendations for his new
administration. The Data Center’s co-director Denice Ross was invited to be part of the team, and
Allen Square, also on the team, ended up becoming the city’s first chief information officer (CIO).
As part of that work, the team reached out to some of the nation’s premier municipal CIOs and
chief technology officers in Boston, Washington, DC, San Francisco, and Tampa. This infusion of
ideas allowed the incoming administration to rapidly modernize and open up. The new CIO
focused for the first year on the uncelebrated work of creating updated civil service job descriptions
(with competitive salaries), stabilizing IT systems, repairing the department’s battered reputation,
and modernizing procurement to accommodate new technologies, such as software-as-a-service
that afforded more flexibility and agility and less risk. At the same time, the incoming CIO
rediscovered the talent and experience already in place in City Hall. By listening to and
empowering these seasoned voices in the city’s IT department, along with hard work, tenacity, and
steady management, the team was able to rebuild an old and failing infrastructure while nurturing
skills that would be needed to maintain healthy systems. Healthy municipal technology systems
are critical to government’s ability to create, use, and share data for public benefit. With a renewed
confidence and a fresh and determined focus on performance and innovation, the City of New
Orleans began to attract the attention of the growing pool of tech talent developing in post-Katrina
New Orleans. New Orleanians who had never before considered government service now found it
a compelling career opportunity. The next CIO, Lamar Gardere, brought this effort to the next
level with a citywide digital equity initiative, which included the active cultivation of highpotential New Orleanians from populations who are typically underrepresented in technology. This
infusion of newly empowered voices, novel thinking, and data talent, combined with high-level
commitment to open government, transformed the city into a legitimate competitor for
participation in national innovation networks such as IBM Smarter Cities Challenge, the Code for
America Fellowship, Rockefeller’s 100 Resilient Cities, and Bloomberg’s iTeams and What
Works Cities.
Along the way, the city’s increasingly sophisticated approach to data allowed for the same
shift to analysis that The Data Center made after Katrina. Performance management was the
driving force behind much of the city’s data analysis. The city initiated public BlightStat24
meetings (inspired by Baltimore mayor Martin O’Malley’s CitiStat),25 designed to bring together
key staff and leaders from across city government to roll up their sleeves to meet Mayor Landrieu’s
audacious goal of eliminating ten thousand blighted properties in four years. Data management
was a key topic of conversation for the first two years of these meetings (started in 2010). Data
from multiple departments, including code enforcement and the city attorney’s office, had to be
compiled and verified to develop an accurate understanding of the status of each parcel. This
initiative created an opportunity for the first compelling, easy-to-understand, use case for open
data.
In 2012, Code for America fellows collaborated with city residents and staff to create an online
tool called “BlightStatus,” which—for the first time since the storm—gave residents, city staff,
and leadership a single, shared view into the status of blighted properties.26 Removing the
asymmetry of information allowed the conversation to shift from arguing about the facts to
discussing what the solutions might be. The city met their goal a year early, and by 2014 had
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reduced blight by thirteen thousand addresses.27 Of note, The Data Center was a symbiotic partner
in the reduction of blight, having set the baseline with their 2008 report called “Benchmarks for
Blight,” which took the innovative approach of using USPS records on addresses unable to receive
mail (e.g., not active and not vacant) as a proxy for blight and then comparing that number across
time and across cities.28 The city and the public came to rely on The Data Center’s independent
analysis of progress against blight.
The success of meeting the blight reduction goal was a proof of concept that allowed the
benefits of open data to permeate throughout city government. City workers who had previously
feared negative repercussions from releasing data found that opening up the data, even with all its
flaws, generated increasing trust among stakeholders, created a mechanism for improving the data,
and most important, fueled community partnerships for accelerating progress. As fear of making
city data freely available subsided, one by one, city departments began opening their data to the
public. In particular, the successful BlightStat initiative inspired the New Orleans Police
Department to open their data, and once the police department was opening their data, it was hard
for other departments to justify keeping their nonsensitive data in the dark.29
As the city got more tech savvy and created more data tools, they were able to more quickly
spin out high-demand data visualizations, such as damage-assessment maps of tornadoes that
struck the city in 2017 or the traffic-and-flood tracking app released in August 2017 to help
residents navigate frequent street floods (http://streetwise.nola.gov/).30 These tools and
visualizations increased residents’ confidence in city data. A virtuous cycle was created where data
tools with relevant use cases created more awareness of the city’s data and technology capacity.
Potential data users shifted their approach from simply extracting city data and building their own
tools to working in partnership with the city to build tools. This shift produced better results
because the city could provide insights about internal business processes and how they affected
the data and its interpretation, as well as point to additional city data that could be used in each
partner's applications. For example, in 2016, after observing contractors in Detroit using
proprietary methods to survey property conditions, the City of New Orleans’s IT team partnered
with a local firm to cheaply collect property-condition data automatically with city-designed
sensor rigs. With help from ESRI, an interface design process informed by community input, and
New Orleanians willing to volunteer their time to score property conditions, the city effectively
leveraged the concept of “civic tech” to crowdsource data collection on blight and property
conditions.31
Now, the City of New Orleans is recognized as a national leader in local government
transparency, with more than two hundred data sets published and its work highlighted regularly
in telling the story of how data can save lives.32 The City of New Orleans was invited to talk about
their data work at the launch of President Obama’s Climate Data Initiative in 2014, and two years
later, the city was on stage at the White House again talking about their leadership in the Police
Data Initiative. The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) was described as the “Queen of open
data” in a 2015 FiveThirtyEight article, and the federal judge overseeing NOPD’s consent decree
described the city’s new data capacity as “a miraculous transformation.”33 By 2016, Mayor
Landrieu had signed the city’s first ever Open Data Policy designed to facilitate and routinize the
release of freely available, public data in New Orleans.34 In 2018, the City of New Orleans became
one of only thirteen cities nationwide to receive the prestigious What Works Cities Certification.35
Today, outside of attention garnered around major Katrina anniversaries (which increase the
audience two-fold), the audience for The Data Center is once again primarily local, with about
eight thousand visits a month to the website. The presence of this data infrastructure continues to
7
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give New Orleans a head start when changes come its way. For example, while other communities
struggle to pull information together about Opportunity Zones for federal tax incentives, wouldbe investors in New Orleans are easily pulling numbers on those neighborhoods from The Data
Center’s website. Most important, those numbers are fortified with analysis from an equity
perspective that increases the likelihood of their being used for good. People with financial
resources and powerful social networks have always had access to the data they need to exploit
neighborhoods; The Data Center levels the playing field so that agents for good also have access
to that same information.

Lessons Learned
•

Lead with the people and what information they need, not the technology. By starting
with data the people needed and tying those data into a change process such as blight
reduction, New Orleans created a narrative (the sky didn’t fall when data were released
and good things happened) that inspired other domains, such as public safety, to follow
suit. Often the best course is to keep the complex technology behind the scenes, using
it to create simple, easy-to-digest information for the public in media formats they
already consume, such as radio and morning news shows or a simple address lookup
like the BlightStatus tool.

1. Build data systems with not for stakeholders. Data needs to be not only technically credible
but relevant and legitimate in the eyes of the community.36 The only way to ensure relevance
and legitimacy is to get feedback early and often from community stakeholders. One rule of
thumb The Data Center has is that if you have to conduct a training to teach someone how to
use your website, you have not designed it well.
•

•

The value of the data intermediary lies not just in its staff but also in its role in
developing talent who, through working relationships and career moves, can then
transfer their knowledge to other organizations. Intermediaries also create data-savvy
social networks within cities that span local government and the nonprofit and private
sectors, connecting them to state and federal government.37
Don’t go it alone. New Orleans was able to accelerate its progress by partnering with
respected national organizations such as Brookings, seeking out advice from municipal
open-government leaders across the country, and participating in networks such as
Bloomberg What Works Cities, Code for America, the National Neighborhood
Indicators Partnership, and 100 Resilient Cities. A 2018 report by New America ranked
New Orleans among the top 10 percent of networked metros.38

2. A data intermediary is crucial civic data infrastructure for navigating shocks and stressors,
whether it be a hurricane, crime, or the emergence of smart cities technologies. An
intermediary can also spur private and public investments by reducing uncertainty after a
shock. It may be that community data capacity before a disaster serves as an amplifier of social
capital that is well-recognized as a key element of resilience.39 For example, Todd Richardson,
who leads the research arm of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),40
declared that he read The New Orleans Index every day after Hurricane Katrina to inform his
decision making and that his highest recommendation for disaster-prone areas was that they
replicate what The Data Center did for New Orleans.41 His doing so is particularly important
because a great deal of federal disaster funding is distributed through HUD. After years of
8
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advising communities who have undergone recent shocks, it has become clear to these authors
that the time to build a data intermediary and build the necessary trust with the community is
before disaster strikes.
Just as the previous decade has seen the advent of ubiquitous mapping, software-as-a-service,
and open government, the next ten years will see similar uncharted territory emerge in smart-cities
technology, private-sector data, and particularly in the ethical use of algorithms and artificial
intelligence in local decision-making. The Data Center is positioned to develop the talent and
social networks needed to leverage these emerging technologies to further improve data
availability and use in New Orleans.
In addition, as The Data Center maintains its focus on the information needed most by
residents of New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana, it is clear that our dissemination efforts must
continue to track two existential threats to the region: disaster risk and increasing inequity. In the
years since Hurricane Katrina, Southeast Louisiana has been struck by multiple hurricanes,
including Ike, Gustav, and Isaac. In 2010 the massive BP oil spill damaged Southeast Louisiana’s
wetlands that provide the region’s first line of defense against hurricane storm surge. And in recent
years, frequent unprecedented rainstorms have flooded dozens of homes and businesses
throughout the region.42 In addition, income inequality is growing more rapidly in New Orleans
than the national average. Growing inequity not only negatively impacts economic growth and the
provision of essential city services but hampers social cohesion and trust in government, which
are critical to the resilience of a community faced with shocks.43
A large share of the US population lives in areas at risk of natural disasters, such as
earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding, and tornados, or even manmade disasters, such as industrial
contamination or terrorist attacks.44 Disasters compounded by inequity are growing nationwide;
the challenges that New Orleans faces are not unique. Data intermediaries nationwide can play a
critical role in disseminating statistics that help communities to be more resilient in the face of
these current and future challenges.
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